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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers what actions the United Nations Security Council has taken with 
regard to climate change thus far, and what actions the Security Council could legally take going 
forward. To this point, the U.N. Security Council (“UNSC” or “Council”) has played a very 
minimal role in addressing climate change. The UNSC has held two debates on the relationship 
between climate change and security, first in 2007 and then in 2011, the latter producing a formal 
Presidential Statement on the topic.  
The U.N. Charter and the literature suggest that the UNSC could theoretically take two 
possible actions related to climate change: (1) handle discrete, traditional conflicts partially or 
wholly caused by climate change; (2) find that climate change represents a “threat to international 
peace and security”, placing the topic within the mandate of the Council, and employ its Chapter 
VI and VII powers to mitigate or adapt to climate change. This memorandum focuses primarily on 
the second, more controversial option, which could include the imposition of economic sanctions, 
the creation of a subsidiary climate change committee, and even the use of force. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. What actions has the UN Security Council taken with regard to climate change?  
To date, the U.N. Security Council has taken very limited action with regard to climate 
change. At the 2005 World Summit the Council passed Resolution 1625, stressing the importance of 
conflict prevention and proactively addressing the root causes of armed conflict, along with other 
social and political crises.1 This seminal Resolution has served as the launching point for advocates 
supporting an increased role for the Council in the climate change arena.2  
The Security Council has convened two formal debates on the relationship between climate 
change and security issues. In 2007, the UK initiated a debate “exploring the relationship between 
                                                     
1
 S.C. Res. 1625, UN Doc. S/RES/1625 (2005) (Sept. 14, 2005). The Resolution states: “Reaffirming the need to adopt a 
broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict and political and social crises in 
a comprehensive manner, including by sustainable development…”  
2
 See Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Letter dated Apr. 5, 2007 
from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/186 (Apr. 5, 2007).  
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energy, security and climate.”3 The debate revealed sharp divides on the role of the Security 
Council in addressing climate change and produced no formal outcome document. 
The 2007 debate focused almost exclusively on whether the Security Council was the 
proper forum to consider the security implications of climate change. The European Union and 
many Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) argued that an increased role for the Security 
Council was within the mandate of the UNSC, although supporters had slightly different takes on 
the extent of the Council’s potential role. 4 The UK argued that the debate should serve primarily to 
raise awareness of the issue, while France and Germany maintained (based on Resolution 1625) 
that the Council should play a role in active prevention. Most aggressively, many Pacific island 
states claimed that climate change presented an active and present threat to peace and security that 
the Security Council had an obligation to address under its mandate. In order to assuage the fears 
of detractors, President Becket noted that the debate and any future Security Council action would 
not undermine the role of other U.N. bodies.5 
Critics, including Russia, China, and the Group of 77 strongly opposed UNSC 
consideration of climate change at all. The Group of 77 argued that Security Council action 
encroached on the mandate of other U.N. bodies better suited to address climate change (namely 
the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the UNFCCC).6 China and many 
other states framed climate change as a development issue that shouldn’t become “securitized.”7 
While most countries accepted some connection between climate change and security, Brazil 
openly questioned the link as tenuous and speculative.8 Many developing nations also called upon 
                                                     
3
 Id. For a full transcript of the debate, see U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5663d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 S/PV.5663 
(Resumption 1) (Apr. 17, 2007). 
4
 For a full and thorough treatment of the debate, including a typology of the opinions and possible UNSC actions, see 
Francesco Sindico, Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?, 1 Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 29 (2007). For a 
statistical analysis on the shifting discourse of climate policy, see Nicole Detraz and Michele M. Betsill, Climate 
Change and Energy Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts, 10 International Studies Perspective 311 (2009).  
5
 U.N Doc. S/PV.5663, supra note 3, at 2. Presidential Statement: “We are not, in this debate, seeking to pre-empt the 
authority of those institutions and processes where action is being decided — the General Assembly, the Economic and 
Social Council and its subsidiary bodies, the United Nations agencies, and, of course, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.” 
6
 Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the U.N., Letter dated Apr. 16, 2007 from the Permanent Representative of 
Pakistan to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/211 (Apr. 16, 2007).  
7
 Statement of the Chinese Delegation, U.N Doc. S/PV.5663, supra note 3, at 12. 
8
 Statement of the Brazilian Delegation, U.N Doc. S/PV.5663 (Resumption 1), supra note 3, at 20.  
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the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.9 While this memorandum does not 
consider the controversy surrounding Security Council reform, some commenters have suggested 
that concerns about the anti-democratic nature of the UNSC likely animate the argument of the 
Group of 77 (whose position is bolstered by the support of China, a permanent member of the 
Council).10 
In 2009, pressed by Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS), the General Assembly 
passed Resolution 63/281 expressing concern about climate change and security issues.11 After 
reaffirming the role of the UNFCCC as the “key instrument for addressing climate change”, the 
Resolution called upon all bodies of the U.N., within their respective mandates, to consider the 
possible security implications of climate change. 12  Pursuant to the Resolution, the Secretary 
General submitted a report on the possible security implications of climate change, finding that 
climate change acts as a “threat multiplier”.13 Resolution 63/281 and the Secretary-General report 
seemed to urge the Security Council to reconsider its role in addressing climate change. 
In 2011, Germany and Pacific island nations organized a second open debate focusing 
specifically on the danger of sea-level rise and food insecurity.14 Much of the debate covered the 
same ground as the first – whether the Security Council was the proper forum to discuss the 
issue.15 Despite General Assembly Resolution 63/681 and the Secretary-General’s report, Russia, 
China, and the Group of 77 remained opposed to Security Council consideration of climate change.  
A few perceptible shifts occurred between 2007 and 2011. First, while the United States 
remained neutral in 2007, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice16 strongly supported 
                                                     
9
 Sindico, supra note 4, at 33.  
10
 CHRIS SPENCE, Who Decides? The Role of the United Nations in Addressing Climate and Energy Insecurity, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND ENERGY INSECURITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR PEACE 170-177 (Felix Dodds, Andrew Higham, Richard 
Sherman ed., 2009). See also Statement of the Qatar Delegation, U.N Doc. S/PV.5663, supra note 3, at 9. 
11
 General Assembly Resolutions may only consider issues and recommend topics to the Security Council and other 
U.N. bodies. U.N. Charter art. 10.  
12
 Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications, G.A. Res. 63/281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/281 (June 11, 2009).  
13
 U.N. Secretary-General, Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 
2009).  
14
 Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, Letter dated July 1, 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Germany to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/408 (July 1, 2011).  
15
 For the full transcript of the debate, see U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6587d mgt., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6587 S/PV.6587 
(Resumption 1) (July 20, 2011). 
16
 Susan Rice was the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. from January 22, 2009 to July 1, 2013.  
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UNSC actions in the June 2011 debate, stating: “It is past time for the Security Council to come into 
the 21st century and assume our core responsibilities.”17 Second, some members of the Group of 77 
(Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Singapore in particular) broke from the group's overall view and 
recognized at least a limited role for the Security Council in addressing climate change. Also, 
Caribbean states, largely backing the Group of 77, diverged from their Pacific island counterparts.  
At the close of the 2011 debate, the Security Council unanimously voted to release a 
Presidential Statement. The Statement first reaffirms the place of the UNFCCC as the key 
instrument for addressing climate change. Second, the Council stated the following:18  
“The Security Council expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of 
climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to 
international peace and security.  
 
“The Security Council expresses its concern that possible security 
implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may 
arise, in particular in small low-lying island States. 
 
Additionally, the Presidential Statement asked the Secretary General to provide “contextual 
information” on the above issues in future reporting. While the  language of the statement was less 
specific than many hoped, this represents the only formal outcome document from the Security 
Council on climate change to date.  
In 2013, the UK and Pakistan co-sponsored an Arria-Formula Meeting19 to again discuss the 
security implications of climate change.20 Pakistan’s involvement was somewhat surprising, as the 
government had previously opposed Security Council involvement in previous debates, even 
giving the Group of 77’s official statement in 2007. Because Arria-Formula Meetings are typically 
informal closed-door meetings, the U.N. provided no transcript of the meeting and no outcome 
document was produced. However, a Marshall Islands government minister stated in a press 
                                                     
17
 U.N. Doc. S/PV.6587, supra note 15, at 7.  
18
 For the full Presidential Statement, see S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/15, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/15* (July 20, 2011).  
19
 For a description of Arria-Formula Meetings, see U.N. Secretariat, Working Methods Handbook: Background Note 
on the "Arria-Formula" Meetings of the Security Council Members (Oct. 25, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml. 
20
 Press Conference, Press Conference on Impact of Climate Change on Marshall Islands (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/130215_MI.doc.htm. 
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conference afterwards that Russia and China (along with the majority of the Group of 77) again 
dismissed any substantive Security Council action addressing climate change.21 
Most recently, in June of 2015 the Security Council held another Arria-Formula Meeting,22 
this time co-sponsored by Spain and Malaysia, discussing the role of climate change as a threat 
multiplier.23 The debate reflected similar ideological divides as before, with the United States, the 
EU, and Pacific island nations supporting a role for the Security Council in addressing climate 
change. The U.S. and EU24 focused primarily on the role of climate change as a threat multiplier, 
while Pacific SIDS25 presented a more urgent and stark reality – climate change actively affects 
their citizens in the form of increased weather events, salinization of drinking water, and sea level 
rise. Interestingly, many African states broke from the G77, arguing that desertification and heat 
waves created economic and social disruption that creates a breeding ground for recruitment into 
radical organizations, such as Boko Haram. While Russia tentatively recognized that climate 
change might present some security threats, both Russia and China opposed Security Council 
consideration of the issue.  
 
B. What actions can and should the Security Council take with regard to climate 
change? 
This section will analyze the U.N. Charter and a growing body of literature discussing the 
possible role of the Security Council with respect to climate change. After providing basic 
                                                     
21
 For additional news coverage of the Arria-Formula Meeting in 2013, see Flavia Krause-Jackson, Climate Change’s 
Links to Conflict Draws UN Attention, Bloomberg Business (Feb. 15, 2013, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-15/climate-change-s-links-to-conflict-draws-un-attention; see also 
Edith M. Lederer, Islands want UN to see Climate as Security Threat, Associated Press (Feb. 15, 2013, 11:19 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/15/islands-un-climate-security/1924331/. 
22
 For a complete write up of the event, including details beyond the released official statements, see Dane Warren and 
Nathan Utterback, United Nations Security Council Holds Special Meeting on Climate Change, Sabin Center for 




 Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations, Climate Change, http://www.spainun.org/climatechange/ (last 
visited July 14, 2015). 
24
 H.E. Mr. Thomas Mayr Harting, Head of Delegation, Del. of the European Union to the U.N., Open Arria-Formula 
meeting on the role of Climate Change as a threat multiplier for Global Security (June 30, 2015). 
25
 Robert Gabu Aisi, Permanent Rep. of Papua N.G. to the United Nations, Statement for Security Council Open Arria-
Formula meeting on the role of Climate Change as a threat multiplier for Global Security (June 30, 2015). 
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information about the structure of the Council, this section will consider whether climate change 
falls under the mandate of the Security Council and what actions the Council could theoretically 
take. In response to perceived failures of the multilateral process, many commenters have argued 
that the Security Council could theoretically play a significant role in addressing climate change 
under the umbrella of a security threat.26 Commenters often frame Security Council involvement as 
“securitization” of the issue.27 
To begin, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 28  The Council is made up of fifteen voting members, including the five 
permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China).29 The General 
Assembly elects the remaining ten members on a rotating basis, considering the members' 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographic 
distribution.  
All decisions of the Security Council require nine affirmative votes, including the 
concurring votes of all permanent members (effectively giving veto power to permanent 
members).30 The voting requirements have been interpreted to allow the passage of a decision or 
Resolution notwithstanding abstention from a permanent member (so long as the measure still 
gets nine affirmative votes). The Security Council has the power to pass Resolutions binding as a 




                                                     
26
 For a thorough description of the failures of the existing regimes, see Alexandra Knight, Note, Global Environmental 
Threats: Can the Security Council Protect Our Earth?, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1553 (2005). 
27
 For a full and thorough discussion of securitization theory and climate change, see Shirley Scott, The Securitization of 
Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have we come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of 
Global Climate Change Policy?, 21 RECIEL 220, (2012). For an in depth statistical model of securitization of climate 
change, see INGRID BOAS, CLIMATE MITIGATION AND SECURITY: SECURITISATION AS A STRATEGY IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLITICS, (Routledge 2015). 
28
 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.  
29
 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.  
30
 U.N. Charter art. 27. para. 2-3.  
31
 U.N. Charter art. 25.  
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1. Does Climate Change Fall Under the Mandate of the Security Council? 
Most of the literature begins by examining the factual link between climate change and 
security issues, discussing sea-level rise, food and water insecurity, etc. This memo assumes the 
factual link and proceeds to examine the legal connection between the two. As noted above, the 
Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Under Article 2.7 of the Charter, the Security Council may not intervene in the purely domestic 
affairs of states.32 Thus, the Council must first determine that climate change represents a threat to 
international peace and security in order to take any action; a task left entirely to the discretion of 
the Council. 33  This section will consider the legal and historical framework of such a 
determination. The following section will cover the actions available to the Security Council as 
provided by the U.N. Charter and various commenters.  
The determination of what constitutes a threat to peace and security falls entirely to the 
Council itself under Article 39 of the Charter. The Council can determine either a “threat to peace”, 
“breach of peace”, or “act of aggression.” In practice, the UNSC has nearly always declared a 
“threat to peace” (the most malleable option).34  Commenters have suggested that the language of 
the charter (“threat to peace”) was left intentionally vague by the drafters to give the Security 
Council flexibility.35 Despite the lack of oversight, the Council often strains to frame topics within 
an international peace and security context.36 The U.N. Charter provides only that the Security 
Council must act within the “Purpose and Principles of the United Nations” 37  and most 
commenters believe that the only true limitation on an Article 39 determination comes from the 
voting politics of the Council.38  
                                                     
32
 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.  
33
 U.N. Charter art. 39.  
34
 See Christine Gray, THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ORDER 606 (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 
2004). 
35
 Darragh Conway provides a helpful and lengthy discussion of the limitations on the Security Council. See Darragh 
Conway, The United Nations Security Council and Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 Climate Law 375 
(2010).  
36
 See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (Dec. 5, 1992), in which the Security Council intervened in a civil 
war in Somalia by framing the issue around the impact on international security (refugees, etc.). 
37
 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.  
38
 Michael Wood, The U.N. Security Council and International Law, Lecture delivered at Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures, Cambridge, UK (Nov. 8, 2006). 
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The Security Council historically limited its activities to discrete military conflicts. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the Security Council has expanded its reach to consider a variety of new 
issues, including human security concerns, humanitarian conflicts, and health crises.39 The Security 
Council recently passed a resolution expressing concern over HIV/AIDS, a distinctly non-military 
topic (something supporters of UNSC action on climate change pointed out in the 2007 and 2011 
debates). 40  The Security Council has also taken quasi-legislative actions in two particular 
instances.41  
Many commenters have pointed out the distinction between state security and human 
security. As noted previously, the Security Council has expanded its reach since the end of the 
Cold War. In 1992, the President of the Security Council stated, “The absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become 
threats to peace and security.”42  
While inter-state conflict as a result of climate change is surely relevant, commenters have 
argued that the threats from sea-level rise and food insecurity most naturally fall under the 
umbrella of human security.43 The concept of human security seems to elude definition but many 
commenters have discussed the links between human security, climate change, and the UNSC.44 
One commenter noted that human security played only a minor role in the 2007 UNSC debate and 
increased in importance in 2011.45 Finally, one author has noted a somewhat disturbing trend 
                                                     
39
 For a thorough treatment of the historical developments that have led to the expansion of the role of the Security 
Council, see Sindico, supra note 4, at 29. 
40
 S.C. Res. 1308, UN Doc. S/RES/1308 (2000) (July 17, 2000); S.C. Res. 1983, UN Doc. S/RES/1983 (2011) (June 7, 
2011). 
41
 S.C. Res. 1373, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) (Sept. 28, 2001) on anti-terrorism; S.C. Res. 1540, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1540 (2004) (Apr. 28, 2004) on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
42
 S.C. Pres. Statement 1992/23500, U.N. Doc. S/23500 at 3 (Jan. 31, 1992).  
43
 See ROSEMARY RAYFUSE, SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 234 (Edward 
Elger 2012). For a helpful diagram of state vs. human security, see MIZAR KAHN, TOWARD A BINDING CLIMATE 
CHANGE ADAPTATION REGIME: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 121 Fig.6.1 (Routledge 2014). 
44
 See Rayfuse and Scott, supra note 43, at 234. See also Trina Ng, Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming 
World: A Role for the Security Council, 15 J Conflict Security Law 275 (2010); see also Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Risky 
Business: The Ups and Downs of Mixing Economics, Security and Climate Change, 10 Mel. J. Int'l L. 439 (2009).  
45
 Hitoshi Nasu, The Place of Human Security in Collective Security, 18 J Conflict Security Law 1, 15 (2013). 
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shifting the focus away from human security (namely on citizens of less developed countries) and 
onto a potential refugee crisis for developed nations.46 
In order to exercise any authority, the Security Council must determine that the mandate of 
the Council covers climate change. Christina Voigt explores three ways to do so:47 (1) A dynamic 
interpretation of Article 39 arguing that climate change impacts peace and security within the 
context of social and economic stability; (2) Focusing on the impact of climate change on human 
rights, including sea level rise, food security, etc.; (3) Breach of an essential international law 
obligation, either under the UNFCCC or customary international law. Seemingly all commenters 
agree that Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would not need revision to accomplish this task – the 
only question is whether the Council will chose to expand its interpretation of Article 39 to include 
climate change.48 After placing climate change within the mandate of the Council, the UNSC could 
then consider possible enforcement measures. 
 
2. Enforcement Mechanisms of the Security Council 
The academic literature on this subject generally divides the possible role of the Security 
Council into two categories.49 First, the Council could limit its action to direct, actual, or threatened 
conflicts caused in part or in full by climate change. This approach is typically considered briefly in 
the literature because no one doubts the mandate of the Council to address these conflicts, just as 
they would any other conflict regardless of the root cause.50 Second and more controversially, the 
Security Council could find a threat to international peace and security and utilize its enforcement 
                                                     
46
 JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
47
 The following book chapter provides an excellent overview of the legal framework tying climate change to the 
Security Council. See Chirstina Voigt, Security in a “Warming World”: Competences of the U.N. Security Council for 
Preventing Dangerous Climate Change, in SECURITY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY NORMATIVE APPROACH 297-303 (Cecilia 
M. Bailliet ed., 2009).  
48
 See Rayfuse and Scott, supra note 43, at 230. 
49
 Id. at 230. See also VESSELIN POPOVSKI AND TRUDY FRASER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS GLOBAL LEGISLATOR 224-
240 (Routledge, 2014). 
50
 Some commenters have argued that the Security Council has already done so in responding to a food crisis in Somalia 
that was perhaps exacerbated by climate change, S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (Dec. 5, 1992), and by 
responding to Iraq’s destruction of Kuwaiti environmental resources, S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991) (Apr. 
3, 1991). Shirley Scott and Roberta Andrade, The Global Response to Climate Change: Can the Security Council 
Assume a Lead Role?, 18 Brown Journal of World Affairs 215, 221 (2011). 
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powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to coerce states to mitigate or adapt to climate 
change.  
 
“Soft” Compliance Measures: 
Before finding a threat to peace and security under Article 39, the Council could take 
preliminary actions under Chapter VI of the Charter. Under Chapter VI, the Council may 
investigate issues that could pose a threat to international peace and security in the future (Article 
34), call for a peaceful settlement of a dispute by arbitration (Article 33.2) and make 
recommendations to dispute parties (Article 38). The literature often spends very little time on 
these possibilities, focusing instead on the more coercive (and controversial) measures under 
Chapter VII.  
If the Security Council finds a “threat to peace” under Article 39 of the Charter, they could 
take a number of actions to mitigate climate change under Chapter VII. First, the Council can call 
upon member states to comply with any provisional measures imposed under Article 40 in order 
to “prevent an aggravation of the situation.” 51  Such provisional measures have traditionally 
included calling upon member states to withdraw armed forces, cease hostilities, and observe 
ceasefires. 52 In the case of climate change, the Security Council could potentially use its Article 40 
power to urge states to ratify certain treaties, or comply with their obligations under an existing 
treaty. 53  While technically non-binding, the Council often utilizes Article 40 as a normative 
compliance tool before resorting to sanctions (Article 41) or authorizing the use of force (Article 
42).  
Going further, some commenters have advocated for the Council to issue a Resolution 
condemning the actions of member states. 54  While condemnations also do not carry binding 
weight, Voigt suggests that they could pull member states towards compliance. Voigt goes on to 
posit that the Council could also ask the ICJ to issue non-binding advisory opinions to determine 
                                                     
51
 U.N. Charter art. 40.  
52
 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Article 40 – Provisional Measures to Prevent the Aggravation of a 
Situation, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml#rel2.  
53
 Christopher K. Penny, Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging "Threat to International 
Peace and Security”, 7 Intl Environ Agreements 35, 53-54 (2007).  
54
 See Voigt, supra note 47, at 310. 
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whether a state has breached its international obligations (UNFCCC or otherwise) and thereby 
normatively induce compliance.55  
 
“Hard” Compliance Measures: 
Perhaps most well-known among the Security Council’s powers is the authority to impose 
economic/diplomatic sanctions (Article 41) and authorize the use of force (Article 42). Additionally, 
the Council has recently utilized quasi-legislative actions (Resolutions 1373 and 1540 discussed 
below). This section will first consider economic and diplomatic sanctions under Article 41 of the 
Charter. Many commenters have advocated for the Council’s use of economic sanctions (or the 
other strategies listed) as a tool to induce compliance with UNFCCC commitments, improving 
upon the Kyoto Protocol’s perceived weak compliance scheme.56  
If the Security Council found a threat to peace, it could impose economic and diplomatic 
sanctions to force states to reduce emissions (either based on UNFCCC targets or some entirely 
new standard created by the Council). Economic sanctions could take a variety of forms, including: 
breaking off or restricting economic ties, blocking imports and exports, and freezing assets.57 
Functionally, the Council would pass a Resolution requiring member states to impose the given 
sanctions.58 Some commenters have also noted that the Security Council has expanded the role of 
sanctions against private individuals in recent years.59 Instead of using economic sanctions directly 
against a non-compliant government, the Council could directly sanction polluting industries or 
block the imports/exports of a particularly harmful product. Apart from the use of force, economic 
and diplomatic sanctions represent perhaps the strongest enforcement tool available to the UNSC. 
Notably, not all commenters support the use of economic sanctions to induce compliance. Early 
commenters rejected outright a role for the Security Council (including economic sanctions),60 and 
                                                     
55
 Id. at 310-311 
56
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a few scholars have noted that economic sanctions tend to harm the most vulnerable members of a 
country and could perhaps worsen environmental outcomes.61  
The Security Council also retains the power to authorize the use of force as a matter of 
international law.62 Some commenters have noted the complex use of force problems that could 
arise in the wake of climate change, including whether a small island nation could claim that sea-
level rise constitutes an “armed attack” within the meaning of the U.N. Charter.63 Many others 
have considered whether the Security Council should enforce potential climate change Resolutions 
by authorizing the use of force – all resoundingly reject it on practical and moral grounds. Scholars 
often note the fear of using environmental harm as a justification for armed conflict.64 Knight, for 
instance, argues that the use of military force runs counter to the objectives of environmental law 
as laid out in the Rio Principles. 65  Various commenters have discussed the creation of an 
environmental peacekeeping squad 66  (termed “green helmets”); the Security Council briefly 
considered and rejected it in the 2011 debate.  
In recent years, the Council has taken an increasingly legislative role in dealing with 
international problems. In response to the September 11th attacks, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1373,67 requiring states to “criminalize terrorist financing, freeze terrorist funds, and 
deny safe haven to terrorists and their supporters.”68 It also required states to become a party to the 
relevant protocols and conventions combatting terrorism. The Council followed this up with 
Resolution 1540, which required states to take specific actions to prevent the proliferation of 
WMDs.69 Both resolutions also created subsidiary bodies to monitor compliance and dealt with 
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global threats. While these quasi-legislative actions have been met with academic criticism70 and 
have faced compliance issues, 71 they arguably set precedent for expanded UNSC action on climate 
change. The Security Council could theoretically use its newly developed legislative power to 
investigate climate change, enforce compliance with UNFCCC emissions obligations, or create 
entirely new obligations. Under the Charter, any Security Council obligations would effectively 
trump existing treaty obligations,72 though it is important to note that the United States and other 
permanent members of the Council can veto any UNSC action.  
Some scholars have noted the possibility of using the Security Council to directly fill the 
gaps left by existing UNFCCC obligations. One critique of the Kyoto Protocol system involves 
leakage of carbon producing industries into countries not covered by binding emissions targets. 
Conway and others argue that the Security Council could theoretically address the leakage 
problem by urging/requiring countries to ratify a new protocol or by simply imposing new 
obligations binding on all nations.73 However, given concerns about institutional expertise and 
encroachment, most commenters have focused primarily on using the Council to improve 
compliance with the UNFCCC process. 
Many scholars have also suggested that the Security Council should create a subsidiary 
body within the Council’s auspices to provide information to the UNSC and monitor compliance 
with UNFCCC or other obligations. 74  Resolutions 1540 and 1373 discussed above provide 
precedent for this type of action. Penny argues that a subsidiary body could provide regular 
reports on climate change to the Council and conduct intrusive examinations of member states – a 
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power only the Security Council can vest.75 A potential “Environmental Security Council” could 
bridge the gap between the Security Council and the UNFCCC, perhaps improving the legitimacy 
of the program. 
Going even further than Penny, Conway examines the ways to unite the enforcement 
power of the Security Council with the targets and reporting mechanisms of the UNFCCC. The 
article discusses multiple strategies, including delegating compliance to a subsidiary organ created 
by the Council, delegating to a non-U.N. body, and allowing the UNFCCC to refer problematic 
compliance cases to the Council. Conway first discusses the possibility of creating a subsidiary 
organ to “act as the Compliance Panel's enforcement arm, leaving reporting, verification, 
monitoring and provision of assistance in the competent hands of the UNFCCC.” As Conway 
notes, creating a compliance subsidiary would contain key flaws. 
The power of the subsidiary to actually enforce compliance with UNFCCC targets is 
limited by the delegatus non potest delegare doctrine, which provides that the Security council must 
retain full control over the subsidiary’s decisions, as well as the power to make ex-post facto 
changes to a decision.76 Conway argues that this limitation, along with a perceived lack of good 
faith on the part of permanent members of the Council could undermine the effectiveness of a 
compliance subsidiary. Conway ultimately posits that the most sensible policy would allow the 
UNFCCC to retain its own reporting and compliance system and refer the most problematic cases 
to the Security Council. 77 
 
C. Evaluation of the Security Council’s Role in Addressing Climate Change 
This section will present some of the practical considerations facing potential Security 
Council participation, as discussed by various commenters.  
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Many early commenters rejected Security Council involvement in addressing climate 
change, arguing that the General Assembly and/or the UNFCCC should take the lead.78 As the 
multilateral process showed signs of failure, scholars have recently reexamined their position, as 
discussed in the previous section. However, many of them still note substantial problems with 
allowing the Security Council to take a leading role on climate change.  
As Shirley Scott argues, any Security Council effort to improve compliance with 
environmental targets could run into a legitimacy problem, especially given the controversy over 
the existing structure of the Council, leading many states to simply refuse to comply with onerous 
obligations or sanctions.79  As Trina Ng points out, Security Council Resolutions are not self-
executing and require implementation by member states, which could lead to compliance 
problems.80 Many commenters have also noted the practical concerns. For instance, the permanent 
members of Security Council include the U.S., which is historically the largest emitter, and the only 
major state that never ratified the Kyoto Protocol; and China, which is now the largest emitter.  
Neither country is likely to allow the Security Council to police its emissions.81  
Many of the articles and books cited herein take no firm position on Security Council 
involvement, but merely explore the legal options available. However, a small number of recent 
commenters explicitly reject Security Council involvement. Trudy Fraser suggests that because the 
Security Council has not had tremendous success inducing compliance on human security issues, 
it should act instead as a norm-setting body.82 Others have argued that the Security Council should 
raise awareness but allow the General Assembly to lead.83 Finally, one commenter agrees with 
Russia and China that Security Council action would only distract from the UNFCCC’s 
prerogative.84  
Finally, the Security Council has given no indication that it plans to take the kind of leading 
role in compliance that many have advocated for. In the 2011 Presidential Statement, the Council 
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reaffirmed the principal role of the UNFCCC. Furthermore, as Scott discusses in greater detail, the 
political climate makes full Council involvement unlikely.85 Finally, many of these articles discuss 
the possibility of using the Council to enforce binding UNFCCC commitments. However, if the 
Paris Conference later this year leads to a regime of political commitments instead of binding ones, 
it seems implausible that the Council would then make those commitments binding though its 
Chapter VII powers.  
Most recently, at the 2015 Arria-Formula Meeting, Professor Michael Gerrard, Director of 
the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, suggested that the Security 
Council could review the security implications of climate change after the upcoming UNFCCC 
Paris Conference in December. 86 The review could include an evaluation of different emissions 
scenarios depending on whether countries meet, exceed, or fail to meet their Paris commitments. 
The Council could then consider finding a “threat to peace” under Article 39 and address forced 
migration and other adaptation challenges caused by climate change.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations Security Council has thus far taken very little direct action on climate 
change. The Council has conducted two open debates (2007 and 2011), primarily considering 
whether the Security Council is the proper forum to consider the security implications of climate 
change. The 2011 debate produced a Presidential Statement expressing concern about the potential 
connection between climate change and security, the only formal outcome document on the topic 
to date. The Council also conducted a 2013 Arria-Formula meeting and reports indicate that Russia 
and China again strongly opposed securitization of the issue.  
Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The Security Council itself determines what issues legally fall 
under its mandate (Article 39). Should the Council make an Article 39 determination, the full 
breadth of its Chapter VII powers would be available (including economic sanctions and even the 
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use of force) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The Council could use this power to enforce 
UNFCCC obligations or create entirely new ones. Finally, the Council also has the power to create 
subsidiary bodies to conduct investigations and perhaps take a leading role in compliance.  
Many scholars have pointed out practical and political issues that could hinder Security 
Council involvement in this area. These include the current political climate of the Security 
Council, perceived legitimacy concerns, and difficulty enforcing obligations against permanent 
members of the Council itself.  
 
 
